山东省农业技术推广条例

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山东省农业技术推广条例

山东省人大常委会


山东省农业技术推广条例
山东省人大常委会


(1992年9月10日山东省第七届人民代表大会常务委员会第三十次会议通过)

目 录

第一章 总 则
第二章 农业技术推广体系
第三章 农业技术推广人员
第四章 农业技术推广管理
第五章 奖励与惩罚
第六章 附 则

第一章 总 则
第一条 为了加速农业科学技术的推广应用,保护农业技术推广者和应用者的合法权益,促进农业生产从传统农业向现代化农业的转变,根据国家有关规定,结合本省实际情况,制定本条例。
第二条 本条例所称农业技术,是指应用于农业的生产技术、农业生产资料监测与使用技术、农产品监测技术以及农业能源利用、环境保护技术。
本条例所称农业技术推广,是指把农业技术普及应用于生产实践中的一切活动。
第三条 凡在本省行政区域内从事农业技术推广和应用活动的单位和个人都必须遵守本条例。
第四条 农业技术推广应面向农村,因地制宜,服务于农业生产;应讲求经济效益、社会效益和生态效益。
第五条 实行农科教结合,加快新技术的推广应用。
科研、教育主管部门应组织科研、教育单位把农业生产中需要解决的技术问题列为课题,向农业技术推广部门提供研究成果,培养人才,结合科研、教学开展技术开发和推广工作。
第六条 省农业行政主管部门主管全省的农业技术推广工作。市(地)、县(市、区)农业行政主管部门主管本辖区内的农业技术推广工作。
第七条 各级人民政府应加强对农业技术推广工作的领导,制定政策措施,协调各方关系,稳定、壮大农业技术推广队伍,保证推广工作的顺利开展。
计划、财政、金融、税收、物资、商业、外贸、人事、物价、技术监督、工商、科技、教育等部门,应在各自职责范围内积极支持农业技术推广工作。
第八条 鼓励、支持有关企事业单位、社会团体和科技人员到农村从事农业技术推广工作,实行有偿服务,保护其合法收入。

第二章 农业技术推广体系
第九条 农业技术推广体系的主体由省、市(地)、县(市、区)的农业技术推广中心、乡(镇)农业技术推广综合服务站和村农业技术服务组(队)、科技示范户组成。
第十条 农业技术推广中心在同级农业行政主管部门的领导和上级农业技术推广中心的指导下开展工作。其主要职责是:
(一)编制农业技术推广工作规划、计划和技术操作规程,并组织实施;
(二)组织实施农业技术推广体系的建设项目,总结推广工作经验,指导推广服务工作;
(三)负责农业新技术的试验、示范和农业科技成果的推广应用;
(四)负责农业技术培训、技术宣传、技术咨询和信息交流;
(五)兴办服务实体,开展农业社会化服务。
第十一条 乡(镇)农业技术推广综合服务站的主要职责是:
(一)负责组织农业技术的示范推广;
(二)负责村农业技术服务组(队)、村农业专业研究组织的业务指导,采取多种形式培训农民技术员、科技示范户;
(三)负责农业生产的技术指导;
(四)兴办服务实体,开展农业社会化服务。
第十二条 村农业技术服务组(队)负责宣传农业科学技术知识,落实技术措施,为农民的生产经营提供服务。
村科技示范户在农业技术推广人员的指导下,通过生产示范,传播农业技术。

第三章 农业技术推广人员
第十三条 农业技术推广机构的技术人员和其他单位从事农业技术推广工作的技术人员,应具有中等以上专业学历,或经过专业培训考核,取得技术员(含农民技术员)以上职称。
第十四条 农业技术推广机构的人员构成,应以专业技术人员为主体,其比例应不少于百分之七十。
第十五条 各级农业行政主管部门应有计划地对农业技术推广人员进行培训,不断提高其业务素质。
农业院校招收新生时,应对基层农业科技人员、农民技术员适当降低录取分数线。
计划、教育部门应安排专项招生指标,统一招收在县以下国家农业技术推广机构工作五年以上的农民技术员,毕业后回原单位工作,其待遇不低于同等毕业生。
第十六条 人事和农业行政主管部门对农业技术推广人员应按国家有关规定,评定技术职称,聘任技术职务。
考核、评定农业技术推广人员技术职称时,应主要看其推广工作的实绩。
第十七条 乡(镇)人民政府应当保证乡(镇)国家农业技术推广机构的技术人员以主要精力从事农业技术推广工作。

第十八条 农业技术推广人员进行技术咨询、技术培训、技术转让、技术承包等服务所得的合法收入受法律保护。
第十九条 农业技术推广人员应维护国家、集体和农民的利益,总结、推广群众的先进经验,积极承担推广新技术项目,并严格按照农业技术推广程序和技术规程完成项目计划;不得徇私舞弊,弄虚作假,欺骗应用者。

第四章 农业技术推广管理
第二十条 推广的农业技术必须具有科学性、先进性、适应性、经济合理性。
第二十一条 农业技术推广活动应严格按照试验(区域试验、生产试验)、示范、培训、推广的程序进行,贯彻执行技术标准或规程,保证推广工作的质量。
第二十二条 农业新技术的研究发明者或者引进者应按规定向省或市(地)农业新技术推广审定委员会提出申请,由农业新技术推广审定委员会按规定程序组织审定。经审定通过的农业新技术,应当列入农业技术推广计划,由农业技术推广机构组织推广应用。
未经审定通过的农业新技术,不得组织大面积推广。
第二十三条 农业新技术可通过技术培训、技术咨询、技术承包、技术转让等形式推广应用。
通过技术承包、技术转让等形式推广应用农业新技术,应当依照国家有关技术合同管理的法律、法规办理。
第二十四条 国家设立的农业技术推广机构的事业费和农业新技术区域试验经费列人同级财政预算,并根据财政收入情况,不断增加农业技术推广事业经费。
第二十五条 各级人民政府建立的农业发展基金,应当划出百分之十以上用于农业新技术的推广应用。
第二十六条 农业技术推广项目经费,按经费管理渠道下达给农业技术推广单位,并按规定用于生产试验、示范,农业技术推广(开发),技术培训、宣传,农业技术推广体系建设和仪器设备配备。
第二十七条 农业技术推广机构的基本建设项目应列入基本建设计划。国家和省投资建设的农业技术推广设施,应按规定比例安排配套资金。
第二十八条 农业技术推广机构可以根据推广工作和生产的需要,实行技术与物资结合,开展有偿服务,兴办服务实体,其收入主要用于本单位发展推广事业。
第二十九条 农业技术推广机构开展有偿服务,兴办服务实体所需资金,金融部门应按国家规定给予贷款,并在落实贷款安全保证措施的同时,适当降低自有资金规定比重;财政部门应安排适当周转金给予支持。
税务部门对经营有困难和新开办的服务实体,应按国家有关规定在税收上给予优惠。
工商行政管理机关对农业技术推广机构兴办服务实体的注册登记,应给予支持。
第三十条 任何单位和个人不得平调、挪用和侵占农业技术推广机构所有的房屋、试验地、资金、仪器设备和其他财产。

第五章 奖励与惩罚
第三十一条 县级以上人民政府应对具有下列条件之一的单位和个人给予表彰和奖励:
(一)引进、推广农业新技术成效突出的;
(二)在培养农业技术推广人才方面作出突出贡献的;
(三)长期在乡镇从事农业技术推广工作,取得显著成绩的;
(四)在领导和支持农业技术推广工作中作出重要贡献的。
第三十二条 违反本条例规定,给应用者或推广者造成经济损失,有下列行为之一者,由人民政府或有关部门责令其赔偿损失或退还被平调、挪用、侵占的财产,并对有关责任人员给予行政处分,情节严重构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任:
(一)擅自推广未经审定通过的农业新技术的;
(二)在推广工作中玩忽职守、不负责任的;
(三)在推广和经营服务中徇私舞弊,弄虚作假,欺骗应用者的;
(四)凭借职权非法干预农业技术推广工作的;
(五)平调、挪用和侵占农业技术推广机构所有的房屋、试验地、资金、仪器设备和其他财产的。

第六章 附 则
第三十三条 本条例具体应用中的问题,由省农业行政主管部门负责解释。
第三十四条 本条例自公布之日起施行。



1992年9月10日
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北京市公共汽车电车车票使用办法

北京市人民政府


北京市公共汽车电车车票使用办法(修改后)

北京市人民政府令第171号


  《北京市人民政府关于修改〈北京市公共汽车电车车票使用办法〉的决定》已经2006年5月24日市人民政府第49次常务会议审议通过,现予公布,自公布之日起施行。

   市长 王岐山

   二〇〇六年五月三十日


北京市人民政府关于修改《北京市公共汽车电车车票使用办法》的决定

  现决定对《北京市公共汽车电车车票使用办法》作如下修改:

  一、第四条第(二)项修改为:“乘客带领一个身高不满1.2米的儿童乘车,儿童免票;带领两个以上身高不满1.2米的儿童乘车,一个儿童免票。”

  二、第五条第(一)项修改为:“月票限当月按照规定的次数使用。”

  三、删去第六条第(三)项。

  本决定自公布之日起施行。1996年8月7日市人民政府批准、1996年8月20日市市政管理委员会发布的《北京市公共汽车电车车票使用办法》根据本决定修正并对第六条项的顺序作调整后,由市交通委员会重新公布。



北京市公共汽车电车车票使用办法


  第一条 为加强本市公共汽车、电车车票的使用管理,维护乘车秩序,根据国家有关规定,制定本办法。

  第二条 本市公共汽车、电车的乘务员,应当对乘客主动售票,认真验票;对不照章购买和使用车票的乘客,按本办法处理。

  第三条 乘坐本市公共汽车、电车的乘客,均须照章购买和使用车票,并接受乘务员验票。

  第四条 乘客乘车必须按下列规定购买车票,凭票乘车:

  (一)按所乘路程的票价购票。禁止不购票或者使用废票乘车,禁止超过票价有效路程乘车。

  (二)乘客带领一个身高不满1.2米的儿童乘车,儿童免票;带领两个以上身高不满1.2米的儿童乘车,一个儿童免票。

  (三)携带行李、物品超过一个座位面积的,应当加购一张车票。

  (四)车票限当次乘车有效,因特殊情况,由乘务员安排换乘的,所购未过站车票有效。

  (五)车票售出,不予退票。

  第五条 乘客乘车使用月票,必须遵守下列规定:

  (一)月票限当月按照规定的次数使用。

  (二)严格按照月票的有效期限和种类使用月票,不持月票乘车的,照章购买车票。禁止使用过期月票和涂改、伪造的月票。

  第六条 乘客下车前不购车票的,视为无票乘车。无票乘车或者不按本办法购票和使用月票的乘客,须按下列规定补交票款:

  (一)超过票价有效路程乘车的,按超过的路程票价补票。

  (二)不购票或者使用废票乘车的,市区线路补交票款5元,郊区线路补交票款10元。

  (三)使用过期月票的,从票面月份的次月l日起至发现日止,每日补交票款2元,但补交票款的总额不超过300元。

  (四)使用其他证件冒充月票以及冒用他人月票的,补交票款150元。

  (五)使用涂改、伪造的月票的,补交票款300元。

  第七条 不按规定购买车票或者使用月票的乘客补交票款后,乘务员须按所补票款额出具补票凭证。

  第八条 不按规定购买车票或者使用月票的乘客,拒绝补票或者拒绝乘务员验票,扰乱公共交通秩序的,移送公安机关依法处理。

  第九条 本办法自发布之日起施行。市人民政府1990年12月26日批准,市公共交通总公司1991年1月1日公布的《北京市公共汽车、电车车票使用办法》同时废止。





The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.